Fortitude West & Fortitude South?

What offensive? Think Fortitude. One day soon, Ukrainian troops will advance out of their lagers and into Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia. It will be the biggest test of the Western European military doctrine developed over decades to counter the Soviet military. That there will be a Ukrainian offensive in the coming weeks is accepted. Only a small cadre of individuals may know what the offensive will look like, its direction, depth, and objectives. The rest of us can only speculate. History tells us that surprise and the ability to mislead the enemy play a critical role in success. History also provides some excellent examples of the type of deception that is underway at this moment. Leading up to D-Day and the invasion of the European continent during the Second World War, a massive programme was created, with two notable (intentionally) false operational plans named Fortitude North and Fortitude South. Fortitude South, the main deception, included the First United States Army Group (FUSAG), an utterly mythical army with Patton as the commanding general. FUSAG was to attack at the Pas de Calais, the narrowest part of the English Channel and the logical place to land to seize the channel ports and advance into Germany.

But the Allies landed in Normandy, not at the Pas de Calais as expected. For too long, Hitler refused to believe that Normandy was the main effort, tying up troops that could have hampered or even thrown the Allies back into the English Channel.

What is Ukraine doing? There are three possible axes for the coming Ukrainian offensive; Western crossing the Dnipro near Kherson, south through Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the sea, or another eastern axis to the East, that I've discussed elsewhere.

I think the best operational names for the Dnipro crossing and a Zaporishshia south axis are Fortitude West and Fortitude South. I'll skip any discussion of Fortitude East for now, though it is my (uneducated) guess that this will be the "real" offensive.

Fortitude West? Ukraine is on the East bank of the Dnipro River around Kherson, but that is meaningless. At most, it is a feint to distract and get the Russians to comment forces and attention to their western flank. It will be virtually impossible for Ukraine to transport adequate forces across that river, under artillery fire, with only pontoon bridges and rivercraft to support them. The Russians must know this. Which makes it all the more “real”. Double bluff. Attempt to distract where a distraction is only that, a distraction. Yet use that distraction, like Operation Overlord, as the real push, regardless of the perils and logistical difficulties. Bluff. Double bluff. Distraction before the 'real’ push. What is it, and for how long can Moscow ignore Ukrainian advances and footholds on the left bank of the Dnipro? And when they do take it seriously and assign forces, and begin to move them, will the ‘real’ Ukrainian push start somewhere else? Rivercraft can transport squad, not Challenger tanks. And landing craft that can transport Challengers are visible from satellites and drones, and can be targeted. And drones are flying up and down the Dnipro, both sides sending them up every day, and probably every night. The nights are becoming shorter, reducing the amount of time to bring armour to the embarkation points, and to get them across, unloaded and into cover. It would not surprise me in the slightest to see reports of Leopards and Bradleys on the east side of the Dnipro, in big “oops” moments. Just big enough to grab Moscow's attention. Meanwhile, the clock is ticking. The ground is firming. The artillery coordinates of defensive constructions are being mapped. Minefields are surveyed, and stockpiles are moved, again under cover of night to reduce drone and satellite observation. If this is the axis of the offensive, they will drive south directly to Crimea, aiming to liberate Crimea and panicking Russian forces and commanders across the rest of the front. The extraction of units to redeploy to the defence of Crimea could strip the front lines in the east, giving Ukraine the opportunity to advance and liberate the rest of Ukrainian territory. Bold, if it works. Fortitude South meets the Maginot Line? And over at the Pas de Calais (the Zaporizhzhia Oblast frontline), forces gather and prepare for the Ukrainian offensive to push through and south to Melitopol. That’s what we've been conditioned to expect, and if we have been conditioned to expect this, then so has Moscow. So the Pas de Calais is where Russian forces will sit, ready for the British tanks to “come ashore”. Enough Ukrainian (and Western military and politicians) have talked about the Southern Offensive and the importance of taking Melitopol and pushing south to the Azov Sea, then turning left (Mariopol) or right (Crimea). This will cut the land bridge to Crimea, forcing all reinforcement and general supplies for military and civilian populations to travel over the bridge, making it a, if not the prime target for, Ukrainian drone and or rocket forces.

And so, Russia is building defensive lines throughout southern occupied Ukraine, lines that are being surveyed daily. The Russians prepared almost 120 km of defensive lines, including multi-layered defence, with anti-tank ditches, lines of "dragons teeth" and then a primary trench line. Reuters also has a fascinating graphic and discussion about the defensive infrastructure in terms of the trenches and defence in depth with multiple lines of trenches. The graphics could be a modernised version of pictures I came across in a book written in the early 1920s, in the Pentagon library. The descriptions and drawings of trenches are, basically, an updated version of that book. While caltrops are no longer mentioned, they have been replaced with "hedgehogs", the modern equivalent designed to slow down or stop a tank instead of a horse. All in anticipation of the offensive. And that will draw more Russian forces and capabilities away from any actual frontline. The bridge is long (the longest in Europe at 19 km) and vulnerable at any point along its length. Defending that bridge is not a matter of positioning forces at either end. They will need maritime resources to be tied up, anti-aircraft and anti-missile forces, all of which detract from what is available for defensive operations to the north. GLOCs (Ground Lines of Communication) are critical for logistical support. Cutting these, when they are actually "ground" lines, is not easy and requires the ability to control or interdict not only the road itself, but enough on either side to make manoeuvre around a damaged section of road equally difficult. The ability to reroute around a damaged piece of road calls for engineers to keep the road open or to bypass the damage. Not so with a bridge. And certainly not so with the Kersh Bridge.

Will the opening action of the offensive be an attack on the bridge? Very probably.

If Russian forces face a southbound offensive, they must concentrate their capability in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and protect the bridge. Russian planners must be looking at the map and their order of battle, trying to determine which units will be able to provide the right defence, and the real force levels of depleted units. The defensive lines they have built may have a distinct advantage in terms of the number of defenders needed to maintain the line (depending on the effectiveness of the attacker, of course), but larger numbers of soldiers are still needed. And each of these will need to be willing to stand their ground in front of advancing tanks, APCs and dismounted infantry. If the defending troops are the survivors of depleted units (as we are told), their morale and capabilities will already be severely degraded. Summary No matter what happens, it probably will not be what we expect. If it is an offensive straight south, then there will be a lot of hard fighting. If it is south across the Dnipro at Kherson, it may include a drive directly toward Crimea, in which case it will run right up against the defensive positions constructed at the narrow entrance to Crimea, and there will be much hard fighting. Expect large-scale use of precision munitions targeting individual defensive positions. But both of these options may be Fortitude West and Fortitude South. The blow may come somewhere else entirely. And so, as each of these potential lines of assault unfolds, the Russian command is going to be asking themselves where the real offensive is taking place. The speed at which they are able to assess and respond to the true line of offence will determine the outcome.

Probably the most important thing to remember right now is that Ukraine has options, and will be doing everything in their power to obfuscate and mask their real intentions. The real axis of the offensive will probably not become clear for some days after it starts. We wait. We all wait.

By May 15 we will know...

May 15th. By this day that the war in Ukraine will have been decided, one way or the other. 

By May 15th, Russia will be willing to negotiate to retain Sevastopol, or Ukraine will be willing to negotiate the final transfer of Crimea to Russia in exchange for peace and a return to the Feb 2022 “borders”. It might not happen on that day, but by then, we will know which will be the more probable outcome. 

 

There will be a Ukrainian spring offensive. This has been foreshadowed since December or before. And both the Ukrainians and the Russians have been attempting to shape the battlefield for just this event. Russia is trying to draw out Ukrainian reserves and shatter their line, forcing the distraction of resources from the offensive.  

 

The defence of Bakhmut has drawn in Russian forces into an inverse caldron, with the defenders taking advantage of terrain and almost a decade to prepare for an expected Russian war. Russian losses outside (and inside) Bakhmut are, according to Western media, staggering. Furthermore, the attention to Bakhmut may be drawing attention away from other potential fronts.

 

Training of Ukrainian tank crews across Europe took place in January and February, and tanks are arriving in Ukraine today. Ukraine today also, probably, has a military that is as large as Russia's, possibly even larger. Conscription and volunteers have swelled the size of the Ukrainian military. I would caution that we have no visibility on Ukrainian losses, but we continue to be told they are significantly lower than Russian losses.

 

The fundamental difference in capacity between Russia and Ukraine is that Russia is the aggressor. Therefore it is more difficult for them to source a large pool of volunteers, while the invaded country can rely on the citizenry to volunteer to defend their country. In addition, Russia has their own stocks of weapons and ammunition, while Ukraine is calling upon the stocks and resources of much of Europe and the United States. While this is simplistic, and Russia is sourcing weapons from international allies (Iran and North Korea, for example) these are providers with far more limited capacity than Ukraine's suppliers. 

 

All this is leading toward a late March offensive. The ground needs to dry, and the forces need to be positioned.  In an age of drones, surprise is harder to achieve, so both sides will see, to some extent, the positioning and manoeuvring of the other.  

 

When it comes, it will be ferocious. And it will need to be. Ukraine will quickly claim resounding successes, and Russia will claim they have stopped the Ukrainians in their tracks. Both sides will flood the info-sphere with photos and video of the other's equipment in flames.  

 

The info-warfare will be playing out to convince audiences far from the battlefield; the politicians and citizens in countries supplying Ukraine. Victory in the offensive will cement support, while a stalled or failed offensive will lead to a too-rapid erosion of support. 

 

By May 15th, we will know if the offensive has been successful, and the question then will be “how far, how fast, and what will Russia salvage"? I predict a successful offensive could see as much as parts of Crimea in Ukrainian hands by the end of summer. Russia may be forced to the negotiating table to retain Sevastopol (because that will not be given up by Russia in any scenario, and a multi-year siege is unrealistic in the “modern” world).  

 

By May 15th, we will know if the offensive has failed to live up to the hype. If this is the case, and the fields of southern Ukraine are littered with burning Leopards and Challengers, Bradleys and Marders surrounded by dead soldiers, then Western public opinion will turn. The prospect of going through the process of arming and training a replacement army will be too much for Western governments, some facing elections cycles. If this happens, Ukraine will be forced to the negotiating table to seek what it can get, which certainly will be more than they have today.  

 

Lurking behind all of this will be the Western governments and their willingness to put (some) sanctions onto a separate negotiating table.  

 

But by May 15th, we will have a pretty good idea of how this war is going to play out. 

Free Kilkis (or, suggesting New Zealand/Aotearoa's defence priorities)

The New Zealand/Aotearoa (NZ/A) Ministry of Defence has posted a survey for Kiwis to “help shape our future Defence strategy.” Interesting idea. And, of course, they've put that on Facebook, so the comments are flowing thick and fast. 

 

We should probably say a few things right up front.  

 

• Fundamentally, NZ/A will not be acting unilaterally, but will act either in support of greater power military endeavours in the northern hemisphere or will be engaged in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency actions in the South Pacific in conjunction with Australia. As such, NZ/A required a defence force of limited size and specialised capabilities. Full-spectrum military capabilities are unnecessary and would impose a fiscal burden not commensurate with either the country's needs or potential conflict participation. 

• NZ/A will not be invading any country, though it might support “assertive” peacekeeping and counterinsurgency in the event of a civil war in a South Pacific neighbour (or climate change emergencies).  

• NZ/A will not be invaded by any power in the foreseeable future. But if it is, it will be after the invading power has defeated or neutralised Australia. There will be no “Red Dawn” in NZ/A, though the ability to create and support a robust insurgency capability should not be rejected out of hand.

• NZ/A's greatest threats come from geological dangers and weather/climate risks. Defence/military capabilities can and frequently do provide “dual-purpose” capabilities. As this is the greatest area of threat to NZ/A citizens and direct economic and social interests, defence capabilities should be focused on meeting international relationship needs while at the same time being positioned to assist the country when in need. 

 

From these four should come a definition of the primary missions of the NZ/A Defence Forces: protection of NZ/A, protection of NZ/A citizens and society, and fulfil of treaty obligation. Each of these contributes to any suggestions on the best force type and structure for NZ/A. 

 

The tyranny, and benefit, of distance 

 

First and foremost, NZ/A is a Pacific nation. The nearest land masses are Australia, Tonga, Fiji and the Antarctic. The closest land mass is Australia, approximately 2100 kilometres (1200 miles) away. NZ/A comprises two primary islands, imaginatively named “North Island” and “South Island”. Across those two islands are spread the five million inhabitants. From a defence perspective, almost half of those five million live in the top three hundred kilometres of the country. 

 

When the world goes to war, NZ/A has historically taken months to join. Well, not to join, but certainly to get any forces to the location of potential fighting. Troopships in WWI and WWII took up to six weeks or more to reach Europe from NZ/A. 

 

Even for tourists and Kiwis wanting to travel into or out of NZ/A, the shortest distance is a three-hour flight. To get anywhere beyond the east coast of Australia, Fiji or Tonga, and the minimum flight time climbs to ten-plus hours.  

 

NZ/A's geographic location means that the danger of invasion is almost non-existent. Any invader would need to pass Australia, an ally and “buffer” state between NZ/A and any adversary. The cultural and historical ties between Australia, NZ/A and much of the “Western” nations mean that any adversary will come from outside that group. This leaves a shortlist of countries that may represent a serious threat. Reaching NZ/A will be the first challenge for any prospective invader. 

 

Of course, any adversary able to reach NZ/A with a viable invasion force would not need to conquer the entire country to bring about a capitulation, at least a capitulation of the national authority.  

 

For years it was a given: 50% of the population lives north of the Bombay Hills (a ridgeline ninety kilometres south of Auckland. So, while the capital may be in Wellington in the geographic middle of the country, the population skews north. Therefore, the conquest of NZ/A would almost be accomplished the parking an adequately sized naval presence off the Auckland coast. 

 

Control the area north of Hamilton, and you effectively control NZ/A, in terms of the capability to export, import, or the ability to mount any meaningful opposition to the exercise of control over other major NZ/A urban populations.  

 

The international alliance system 

 

After all, if you were at war with NZ/A, you probably are also at war with Australia, and through them, probably with the “West” in general. Therefore, to be able to deliver an adequate force to NZ/A waters assumes that you have been able to fight your way past, or otherwise remove Australia as an impediment to the conquest of NZ/A. If that were to happen, it is highly unlikely that NZ/A would have the capacity to withstand such as invasion force. A negotiated peace would ensure. But not a peaceful occupation. 

 

ANZAC may no longer exist, but that has not stopped NZ/A from contributing forces to virtually all major international expeditionary or peacekeeping missions of the past thirty-five years. Admittedly, the NZ contribution has been medical corps and training, which is more in keeping with NZ/A's internal and international reputation as a “peaceful” country. Nonetheless, should the country be threatened, or the region is threatened, NZ/A would participate in and could expect to be supported by an international coalition. 

 

Furthermore, the nature of international conflicts has changed dramatically over the past two decades. While it remains the norm for countries to maintain the full panoply of military capabilities (within their fiscal capabilities, of course), such thinking and spending may no longer be effective.  

 

Force restructuring 

 

In the early 1980s, the Air Force was lauded as flying old airframes (A4 Skyhawks) with the latest electronics, making them the match for state-of-the-art aircraft of that day. But over the years, ensuring a small force could retain currency of capacity became more expensive, eventually prohibitively. Decades ago, NZ/A determined that it no longer could afford to maintain a full Air Force capability. Likewise, although it is an island nation, a large standing navy sufficient to stand up to potential adversary naval power was far beyond its fiscal capacity. The NZ Defence Forces have continued to adapt.  

 

The Leander class frigates (crewed by “Leanderthals”) were commissioned in the UK, with the NZ/A hulls commissioned in the 1950s through the 1970s, serving for 35 or more years until the final one was decommissioned in the early 2000s. The current navy comprises nine ships of which three are laid up do to staffing constraints, leaving six active vessels, three of which are logistical support vessels. () 

 

The NZ/A Navy is not going to be stopping any committed adversary. 

 

Logistical support vessels, however, will ensure that the problems of a “simple” counterinsurgency operation such as “Golden Fleece” in 1989 will be avoided. In 1989, the NZ/A Army held a counterinsurgency exercise known as Golden Fleece in an invented country (“Kilkis”), covering the Wairarapa and up toward Hawkes Bay through Dannevirke and north. While there is no active insurgency in NZ/A, there remains the risk that NZ/A may be called upon to support counterinsurgency activity in neighbouring South Pacific countries. 

 

Potential independent actions 

 

There is the possibility that NZ/A might need to “go it alone” on some missions. But those would, by necessity, be in NA/Z's "backyard” and would be against potential opponents significantly smaller than NZ/A. 

 

A country with a population of five million is not going to be leading an invasion of any country outside of its immediate neighbours in the South Pacific, and there are few (but potentially real) situations that could lead to that occurring. The coup in Fiji in the late 1980s almost resulted in military intervention by NZ/A and Australia. Had the situation degenerated into full-scale civil war, intervention may have been the only way to bring peace. In such a situation, NZ/A would face the dual requirements to deliver, land and support a force over potentially thousands of kilometres of ocean. 

 

It is probable that any intervention in a South Pacific neighbour may also require a counterinsurgency effort. NZ/A could be well positioned to carry out such a mission, calling on the large South Pacific population in NZ/A for support.   

 

Moreover, an insurgency is probably the only serious option that NZ/A would have in the event of an actual invasion of NZ/A. The distribution of population would be a mixed bag, both working to an occupier's advantage, and supporting an insurgency. Much of the population, being situated in the north of the country, would be slightly easier to control. But the agriculturally productive areas are further south, and agricultural production capacity is one of the few reasons that NZ/A would be “worth” invading. 

 

Force recommendations (macro) 

 

NZ/A, to meet its strategic situation and potential threats, needs to concentrate on three areas of capability: 

 

• Medical support capacity 
• Training capacity 
• Civil defence and domestic defence capabilities 

 

Each of these represents “dual-use” capabilities; able to support international defence commitments, and able to directly support NZ/A in the event of a local capacity-exceeding event. The recent cyclones have demonstrated just how important it is to have such capabilities at home and be ready to respond to a local need. At the same time, NZ/A international commitments and our desire to “do the right thing” means that capabilities that work with allies are critical. We will never have the mass to be able to contribute manpower or materials to the fight; not in quantities that will make a tangible difference. But NZ/A does have the ability and capacity to provide the supporting resources that will help win the fight, win the peace, and create the long-term relationships that will make NZ/A a valued partner for the future. 

Each of these also ensures that a Free Kilkis will continue to survive in the South Pacific, whatever the situation in the rest of the world.