Tomorrow marks the 1st anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Things are “clearer” now, certainly, but equally could still go either way. The “End Game” is too far to see. However, there are a couple of outcomes that remain possible:
- Ukrainian collapse and Russian victory
- Russia “holds the line” at the newly conquered territories, and institutes a hot peace
- Partial Ukrainian victory, Russia retains Crimea
- Russia is pushed out of all Ukrainian territory to pre-2014 borders
Throughout the war, the full depth of Western intelligence support has not been visible to the layperson. We've seen hints, including the latest revelations, that the US military has exercised a de facto veto on HIMARS launches and has suggested targets. It is my own belief, without evidence, that Western intelligence support has been extensive, to the point of telling the Ukrainian military the location of Russian command posts and detailed discussion of Russian tactical plans, possibly on a day-by-day basis.
But the “fog of war” can be beneficial to both sides, but is decidedly dangerous to the side with the greater “fog” in terms of their visibility of adversary objectives, capabilities, and detailed plans. Hannibal knew that Lake Trasimene was prone to fog in the summer months, and on 21 June 217 BC, he used that to his advantage. His armies were arranged on the hills overlooking the edge of the lake and the road along the lake. As the Roman legions passed before them, the Carthaginians charged out of the fog into the side of the Roman legions, forcing them into the lake, resulting in one of the most lopsided victories in history.
When one side can see and (as in Hannibal's case) hear the enemy who is unable to see and hear them, then the results will be very one-sided.
But here is our problem. We know that the West can see and hear the Russians and is passing on a huge amount of information. What we do not know is how much Russia can see and hear. We also have a lopsided information stream on losses by either side, with Russian losses being well-publicised, while Ukrainian losses are not being disclosed. We have no visibility on the actual losses suffered in the defence of Bakhmut, or the counteroffensive to retake Kherson. Russian losses of tanks and armoured vehicles are shared on various social media and mainstream media outlets. Ukrainian losses are never shown in Western outlets.
But we must assume that the “see and hear” advantage lays with the Ukrainian side, and that ability is being used on a daily basis.
This leads us to the four potential outcomes I mentioned.
1. Russian victory.
Our first consideration is the meaning of “victory”. There seem to be two “definitions” that I'm hearing: total collapse and takeover of all of Ukraine, including Kyiv and the installation of a puppet government controlled from Moscow, or the ability to force Ukraine to the negotiating table and agreement to the forfeiture of the Donbas and Luhansk, Crimea and Zaporizhia Oblast to Russia.
Yes, Ukrainian forces could still be routed. It seems unlikely at this stage, short of the use of tactical nuclear weapons to breach holes in the Ukrainian front lines, but it remains a possibility. After all, we have no idea just how much of the existing Ukrainian capability is being used to plug the potential gap of Bakmut. If the Ukrainians have been throwing reserves into that fight, stripping themselves of a counter-punch capability, then a significant breakthrough could result in Russian forces sweeping into an almost empty backfield. This was the Soviet strategy at Stalingrad, and it worked. With German lines extended, the Soviet forces punched holes north and south, and fought through the snow to meet, cutting off the German 6th Army. Russian forces north and south of Bakhmut are undoubtedly hoping to accomplish the same.
Should that succeed, and a cauldron is created trapping a large portion of the available Ukrainian capacity, then Russian forces might be able to advance further west with limited opposition. A rout of Ukrainian forces would then require the West to either directly engage, which they have said they will not do, or to facilitate a retreat of Ukrainian forces and potentially an evacuation of the government from Kyiv.
2. Stalemate
A second option calls for Russian forces to degrade Ukrainian capacity to the extent that an effective counteroffensive fails to achieve meaningful gains, and stalls with heavy losses of Ukrainian forces and western equipment. Should Russia retain control of their “land bridge” to Crimea, Ukraine's options will be limited Russia does have a material and population advantage over Ukraine, and a longer war will allow, at a terrible economic cost to Russia (and Ukraine, of course) the mobilisation and deployment of significantly larger numbers of troops than Ukraine will ever be able to mobilise.
Should a Ukrainian counteroffensive prove unsuccessful, the patience of the West and suppliers to Ukraine could wear thin. Domestic pressures in Western capitals could force countries to re-evaluate the level of support that they can provide on in the medium term – out one to two years. Western arsenals are not bottomless, and have been strained by the outflow of materials to Ukraine. They will need to ramp up production, and the costs of the war will begin to come home
Likewise, a failed or blunted counteroffensive will have a cooling effect on morale in Kyiv and across Ukraine.
At some stage, both countries, Russia and Ukraine, may decide that it is time to approach the negotiating table. The moment that happens, the fronts will effectively stabilise and become the new de facto borders, just as the borders changed after 2014. The West will look for some accommodation. A new Iron Curtain will certainly have fallen, and a new Cold War will ensue, but a fighting war with the risk of a nuclear exchange will have been averted.
3. Partial Ukrainian victory.
The great Russian offensive does not seem to be making much headway, at least according to Ukrainian and western media sources. Next comes a period of relative quiet while Ukrainian forces prepare for their offensive. Soon we will see the actual effectiveness of Western amour and tactics against a post-Soviet military and doctrine. Will Leopard tanks in their various versions, stand up well to modernised T-series tanks? How will the Bradleys perform? Will NATAO Combined Arms warfare create the breakthrough that Kyiv will require? Will Russian morale be as low as we are told, or will they rally?
Will Ukrainian forces have the stamina to continue, or will they exhaust themselves? An exhausted army will not continue an offensive, but will begin in the face of stiffening opposition to find naturally defensive or symbolic lines for defence.
Regardless, a Ukrainian offensive that liberates all territories to the shores of the Azov would be a remarkable result. Then we will see how seriously Putin takes his Crimea “Red Line”. If it becomes clear that Ukraine will be “permitted” to liberate up to the 2014 lines (ex-Crimea) but that Russia will use nuclear weapons in the face of an attempted liberation of Crimea, we may have conditions for negotiations to begin.
Russia has historical interests and a deeply held ownership of Crimea. Most of the population speaks Russian, and Russians have been the largest demographic group since the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Savastapol has been the home of the Black Sea Fleet since the city was founded in 1783.
4. Finally, outright victory by Ukraine.
The coming Ukrainian offensive, if wildly successful, would cut the Landbridge and retake the Azov coast up to the pre-2014 borders. Coupled with ongoing attacks on and damage to the Crimean Bridge, also called Kerch Strait Bridge, Crimea would become a siege province. With the primary water supply cut off, limited or no food imports, and ammunition and weapons replenishment were severely hampered. Yet sieges can last for years.
Taking Crimea will require an assault that will test any military capability. And at the far end of the peninsula, Sevastopol awaits. There will be no negotiated or battlefield solution that does not result in Russian control over Sevastopol and the naval base.
