Showing posts with label War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label War. Show all posts

07 March 2026

(Quick Observations) Iran & the promise to not attack GCC countries

An interesting move by the Iranian president this morning, saying that he must apologise for Iranian attacks on Gulf States, and that all such attacks will stop unless attacks on Iran originate in their territories. Shroud tactics. This is a direct statement to the leadership of the Gulf States that they can stop any attacks on themselves by withdrawing support for and allowing the US to use their bases.  

 

This will have zero effect today or tomorrow. But in two weeks, the cracks will begin, as the US continues to attack Iran, and the Gulf States cannot export oil, or even have their airports function. And their comparatively large populations, most of them non-citizens, may begin to feel pressure to access food, if imports cannot arrive via the Straits.  

 

Iran does not need to attack the GCC countries to close the Straits, although attacks on shipping will be attacks in the Omani section of the waterway. They simply need to hit one of the 90+ tankers that transit per day. And the American Navy, no matter how good it is, will have a very difficult time protecting all of those ships. There will be burning ships if they try to pass through, and no matter what level of “insurance” Trump is willing to sell them, shipping companies would rather have ships than insurance payouts. 

 

When it comes time, we probably won’t see any big announcements, just a quiet stopping of US assets using bases in Gulf states. There may be a temper tantrum from Washington for the first, but by the time a country is ready to remove Washington, they will already have gamed out their response. Then another country will, equally quietly, tell the Americans to pack up and move on. Eventually, the US will be forced either to occupy their bases, simply refusing to abide by the host countries' demands, or stretch their supply lines even further. If they decide to ignore the host countries’ demands, they will continue their war from ‘up close’, but will have a very difficult diplomatic future once the war ends.  

 

The Gulf States know that they are in the crosshairs because of Trump’s erratic and deranged behaviour, and know that this will not change as long as he is in power. So they will turn to their own power, the economic power of oil, to ensure prices stay high and the US economy suffers.  

 

Ukraine will also be suggesting that the US needs to support them a bit more if the US is to gain access to Ukrainian drone specialists, people who are not ‘extra’ because they are desperately needed inside Ukraine. I don’t think JD Vance will be told to “say Thank You”, but I suspect the Ukrainian position on the availability of people will not be as straightforward as Washington expects.  

  

28 January 2026

Venezuela - Scenarios and Predictions

On 3 January 2026, the United States military, under the pretence of "law enforcement", invaded Venezuela and apprehended Nicolas Maduro, the sitting president (the legitimacy of his presidency is irrelevant to the nature of the action), and whisked him away to New York to stand trial. It took less than a day for the president to pivot from "it's the drugs" to "it's the oil, and we want it".

As soon as the news calmed down, I was asked to write my thoughts on the event. This paper is the result of that thinking and writing. Using a Risk Management paradigm that identifies and considers scenarios, I have attempted to outline the background and then describe several potential scenarios. I've included my completely arbitrary assessment of the probability of the scenarios occurring, and an equally arbitrary estimate of the timeframe.

It is, however, worth repeating a quote from Stephen Miller, President Trump's Assistant Chief of Staff, who is reputed to have the president's ear and trust.

“We live in a world, in the real world, Jake, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time. We set the terms and conditions. We have a complete embargo on all of their oil and their ability to do commerce. So, for them to do commerce, they need our permission. For them to be able to run an economy, they need our permission. So the United States is in charge. The United States is running the country.”

Instead of outlining the document in detail, I'll include two Infographics produced by ChatGPT from it. One considers the document from the US American perspective, and the other from the Venezuelan perspective.

The US American Perspective:


The Venezuelan Perspective:


I would add that this post marks my first attempt to use AI to create an infographic from my content. The entire process of using AI to review and 'improve' my thinking has been unnerving, and there can be little doubt that the use of AI will alter people's creative processes. I am not yet convinced that the improvement will be for the better.


23 February 2023

One year in, where to now for Ukraine and Russia

Tomorrow marks the 1st anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Things are “clearer” now, certainly, but equally could still go either way. The “End Game” is too far to see. However, there are a couple of outcomes that remain possible:  

  

  1. Ukrainian collapse and Russian victory  
  2. Russia “holds the line” at the newly conquered territories, and institutes a hot peace  
  3. Partial Ukrainian victory, Russia retains Crimea  
  4. Russia is pushed out of all Ukrainian territory to pre-2014 borders  

  

Throughout the war, the full depth of Western intelligence support has not been visible to the layperson. We've seen hints, including the latest revelations, that the US military has exercised a de facto veto on HIMARS launches and has suggested targets. It is my own belief, without evidence, that Western intelligence support has been extensive, to the point of telling the Ukrainian military the location of Russian command posts and detailed discussion of Russian tactical plans, possibly on a day-by-day basis.   

  

But the “fog of war” can be beneficial to both sides, but is decidedly dangerous to the side with the greater “fog” in terms of their visibility of adversary objectives, capabilities, and detailed plans. Hannibal knew that Lake Trasimene was prone to fog in the summer months, and on 21 June 217 BC, he used that to his advantage. His armies were arranged on the hills overlooking the edge of the lake and the road along the lake. As the Roman legions passed before them, the Carthaginians charged out of the fog into the side of the Roman legions, forcing them into the lake, resulting in one of the most lopsided victories in history.   

  

When one side can see and (as in Hannibal's case) hear the enemy who is unable to see and hear them, then the results will be very one-sided.   

  

But here is our problem. We know that the West can see and hear the Russians and is passing on a huge amount of information. What we do not know is how much Russia can see and hear. We also have a lopsided information stream on losses by either side, with Russian losses being well-publicised, while Ukrainian losses are not being disclosed.  We have no visibility on the actual losses suffered in the defence of Bakhmut, or the counteroffensive to retake Kherson. Russian losses of tanks and armoured vehicles are shared on various social media and mainstream media outlets. Ukrainian losses are never shown in Western outlets.   

  

But we must assume that the “see and hear” advantage lays with the Ukrainian side, and that ability is being used on a daily basis.   

  

This leads us to the four potential outcomes I mentioned.  

  

1. Russian victory.


Our first consideration is the meaning of “victory”. There seem to be two “definitions” that I'm hearing: total collapse and takeover of all of Ukraine, including Kyiv and the installation of a puppet government controlled from Moscow, or the ability to force Ukraine to the negotiating table and agreement to the forfeiture of the Donbas and Luhansk, Crimea and Zaporizhia Oblast to Russia.   

  

Yes, Ukrainian forces could still be routed. It seems unlikely at this stage, short of the use of tactical nuclear weapons to breach holes in the Ukrainian front lines, but it remains a possibility. After all, we have no idea just how much of the existing Ukrainian capability is being used to plug the potential gap of Bakmut. If the Ukrainians have been throwing reserves into that fight, stripping themselves of a counter-punch capability, then a significant breakthrough could result in Russian forces sweeping into an almost empty backfield. This was the Soviet strategy at Stalingrad, and it worked. With German lines extended, the Soviet forces punched holes north and south, and fought through the snow to meet, cutting off the German 6th Army. Russian forces north and south of Bakhmut are undoubtedly hoping to accomplish the same.   

  

Should that succeed, and a cauldron is created trapping a large portion of the available Ukrainian capacity, then Russian forces might be able to advance further west with limited opposition. A rout of Ukrainian forces would then require the West to either directly engage, which they have said they will not do, or to facilitate a retreat of Ukrainian forces and potentially an evacuation of the government from Kyiv.   

   

2. Stalemate


A second option calls for Russian forces to degrade Ukrainian capacity to the extent that an effective counteroffensive fails to achieve meaningful gains, and stalls with heavy losses of Ukrainian forces and western equipment. Should Russia retain control of their “land bridge” to Crimea, Ukraine's options will be limited Russia does have a material and population advantage over Ukraine, and a longer war will allow, at a terrible economic cost to Russia (and Ukraine, of course) the mobilisation and deployment of significantly larger numbers of troops than Ukraine will ever be able to mobilise.  

  

Should a Ukrainian counteroffensive prove unsuccessful, the patience of the West and suppliers to Ukraine could wear thin. Domestic pressures in Western capitals could force countries to re-evaluate the level of support that they can provide on in the medium term – out one to two years. Western arsenals are not bottomless, and have been strained by the outflow of materials to Ukraine. They will need to ramp up production, and the costs of the war will begin to come home   

  

Likewise, a failed or blunted counteroffensive will have a cooling effect on morale in Kyiv and across Ukraine.  

  

At some stage, both countries, Russia and Ukraine, may decide that it is time to approach the negotiating table. The moment that happens, the fronts will effectively stabilise and become the new de facto borders, just as the borders changed after 2014. The West will look for some accommodation. A new Iron Curtain will certainly have fallen, and a new Cold War will ensue, but a fighting war with the risk of a nuclear exchange will have been averted.   

  

3. Partial Ukrainian victory.


The great Russian offensive does not seem to be making much headway, at least according to Ukrainian and western media sources. Next comes a period of relative quiet while Ukrainian forces prepare for their offensive. Soon we will see the actual effectiveness of Western amour and tactics against a post-Soviet military and doctrine. Will Leopard tanks in their various versions, stand up well to modernised T-series tanks? How will the Bradleys perform? Will NATAO Combined Arms warfare create the breakthrough that Kyiv will require? Will Russian morale be as low as we are told, or will they rally?  

  

Will Ukrainian forces have the stamina to continue, or will they exhaust themselves? An exhausted army will not continue an offensive, but will begin in the face of stiffening opposition to find naturally defensive or symbolic lines for defence.   

  

Regardless, a Ukrainian offensive that liberates all territories to the shores of the Azov would be a remarkable result. Then we will see how seriously Putin takes his Crimea “Red Line”. If it becomes clear that Ukraine will be “permitted” to liberate up to the 2014 lines (ex-Crimea) but that Russia will use nuclear weapons in the face of an attempted liberation of Crimea, we may have conditions for negotiations to begin.   

  

Russia has historical interests and a deeply held ownership of Crimea. Most of the population speaks Russian, and Russians have been the largest demographic group since the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Savastapol has been the home of the Black Sea Fleet since the city was founded in 1783.  

  

4. Finally, outright victory by Ukraine.


The coming Ukrainian offensive, if wildly successful, would cut the Landbridge and retake the Azov coast up to the pre-2014 borders. Coupled with ongoing attacks on and damage to the Crimean Bridge, also called Kerch Strait Bridge, Crimea would become a siege province. With the primary water supply cut off, limited or no food imports, and ammunition and weapons replenishment were severely hampered. Yet sieges can last for years.  

  

Taking Crimea will require an assault that will test any military capability. And at the far end of the peninsula, Sevastopol awaits. There will be no negotiated or battlefield solution that does not result in Russian control over Sevastopol and the naval base.