What offensive? Think Fortitude. One day soon, Ukrainian troops will advance out of their lagers and into Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia. It will be the biggest test of the Western European military doctrine developed over decades to counter the Soviet military. That there will be a Ukrainian offensive in the coming weeks is accepted. Only a small cadre of individuals may know what the offensive will look like, its direction, depth, and objectives. The rest of us can only speculate. History tells us that surprise and the ability to mislead the enemy play a critical role in success. History also provides some excellent examples of the type of deception that is underway at this moment. Leading up to D-Day and the invasion of the European continent during the Second World War, a massive programme was created, with two notable (intentionally) false operational plans named Fortitude North and Fortitude South. Fortitude South, the main deception, included the First United States Army Group (FUSAG), an utterly mythical army with Patton as the commanding general. FUSAG was to attack at the Pas de Calais, the narrowest part of the English Channel and the logical place to land to seize the channel ports and advance into Germany.
But the Allies landed in Normandy, not at the Pas de Calais as expected. For too long, Hitler refused to believe that Normandy was the main effort, tying up troops that could have hampered or even thrown the Allies back into the English Channel.
What is Ukraine doing? There are three possible axes for the coming Ukrainian offensive; Western crossing the Dnipro near Kherson, south through Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the sea, or another eastern axis to the East, that I've discussed elsewhere.
I think the best operational names for the Dnipro crossing and a Zaporishshia south axis are Fortitude West and Fortitude South. I'll skip any discussion of Fortitude East for now, though it is my (uneducated) guess that this will be the "real" offensive.
Fortitude West? Ukraine is on the East bank of the Dnipro River around Kherson, but that is meaningless. At most, it is a feint to distract and get the Russians to comment forces and attention to their western flank. It will be virtually impossible for Ukraine to transport adequate forces across that river, under artillery fire, with only pontoon bridges and rivercraft to support them. The Russians must know this. Which makes it all the more “real”. Double bluff. Attempt to distract where a distraction is only that, a distraction. Yet use that distraction, like Operation Overlord, as the real push, regardless of the perils and logistical difficulties. Bluff. Double bluff. Distraction before the 'real’ push. What is it, and for how long can Moscow ignore Ukrainian advances and footholds on the left bank of the Dnipro? And when they do take it seriously and assign forces, and begin to move them, will the ‘real’ Ukrainian push start somewhere else? Rivercraft can transport squad, not Challenger tanks. And landing craft that can transport Challengers are visible from satellites and drones, and can be targeted. And drones are flying up and down the Dnipro, both sides sending them up every day, and probably every night. The nights are becoming shorter, reducing the amount of time to bring armour to the embarkation points, and to get them across, unloaded and into cover. It would not surprise me in the slightest to see reports of Leopards and Bradleys on the east side of the Dnipro, in big “oops” moments. Just big enough to grab Moscow's attention. Meanwhile, the clock is ticking. The ground is firming. The artillery coordinates of defensive constructions are being mapped. Minefields are surveyed, and stockpiles are moved, again under cover of night to reduce drone and satellite observation. If this is the axis of the offensive, they will drive south directly to Crimea, aiming to liberate Crimea and panicking Russian forces and commanders across the rest of the front. The extraction of units to redeploy to the defence of Crimea could strip the front lines in the east, giving Ukraine the opportunity to advance and liberate the rest of Ukrainian territory. Bold, if it works. Fortitude South meets the Maginot Line? And over at the Pas de Calais (the Zaporizhzhia Oblast frontline), forces gather and prepare for the Ukrainian offensive to push through and south to Melitopol. That’s what we've been conditioned to expect, and if we have been conditioned to expect this, then so has Moscow. So the Pas de Calais is where Russian forces will sit, ready for the British tanks to “come ashore”. Enough Ukrainian (and Western military and politicians) have talked about the Southern Offensive and the importance of taking Melitopol and pushing south to the Azov Sea, then turning left (Mariopol) or right (Crimea). This will cut the land bridge to Crimea, forcing all reinforcement and general supplies for military and civilian populations to travel over the bridge, making it a, if not the prime target for, Ukrainian drone and or rocket forces.
And so, Russia is building defensive lines throughout southern occupied Ukraine, lines that are being surveyed daily. The Russians prepared almost 120 km of defensive lines, including multi-layered defence, with anti-tank ditches, lines of "dragons teeth" and then a primary trench line. Reuters also has a fascinating graphic and discussion about the defensive infrastructure in terms of the trenches and defence in depth with multiple lines of trenches. The graphics could be a modernised version of pictures I came across in a book written in the early 1920s, in the Pentagon library. The descriptions and drawings of trenches are, basically, an updated version of that book. While caltrops are no longer mentioned, they have been replaced with "hedgehogs", the modern equivalent designed to slow down or stop a tank instead of a horse. All in anticipation of the offensive. And that will draw more Russian forces and capabilities away from any actual frontline. The bridge is long (the longest in Europe at 19 km) and vulnerable at any point along its length. Defending that bridge is not a matter of positioning forces at either end. They will need maritime resources to be tied up, anti-aircraft and anti-missile forces, all of which detract from what is available for defensive operations to the north. GLOCs (Ground Lines of Communication) are critical for logistical support. Cutting these, when they are actually "ground" lines, is not easy and requires the ability to control or interdict not only the road itself, but enough on either side to make manoeuvre around a damaged section of road equally difficult. The ability to reroute around a damaged piece of road calls for engineers to keep the road open or to bypass the damage. Not so with a bridge. And certainly not so with the Kersh Bridge.
Will the opening action of the offensive be an attack on the bridge? Very probably.
If Russian forces face a southbound offensive, they must concentrate their capability in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and protect the bridge. Russian planners must be looking at the map and their order of battle, trying to determine which units will be able to provide the right defence, and the real force levels of depleted units. The defensive lines they have built may have a distinct advantage in terms of the number of defenders needed to maintain the line (depending on the effectiveness of the attacker, of course), but larger numbers of soldiers are still needed. And each of these will need to be willing to stand their ground in front of advancing tanks, APCs and dismounted infantry. If the defending troops are the survivors of depleted units (as we are told), their morale and capabilities will already be severely degraded. Summary No matter what happens, it probably will not be what we expect. If it is an offensive straight south, then there will be a lot of hard fighting. If it is south across the Dnipro at Kherson, it may include a drive directly toward Crimea, in which case it will run right up against the defensive positions constructed at the narrow entrance to Crimea, and there will be much hard fighting. Expect large-scale use of precision munitions targeting individual defensive positions. But both of these options may be Fortitude West and Fortitude South. The blow may come somewhere else entirely. And so, as each of these potential lines of assault unfolds, the Russian command is going to be asking themselves where the real offensive is taking place. The speed at which they are able to assess and respond to the true line of offence will determine the outcome.
Probably the most important thing to remember right now is that Ukraine has options, and will be doing everything in their power to obfuscate and mask their real intentions. The real axis of the offensive will probably not become clear for some days after it starts. We wait. We all wait.
