One morning in the early 1950s, Herb Roberts and the rest of his US Army unit stood at parade rest while a small convoy arrived at their post. Out came Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to inspect the troops, and thank them for their presence and what that meant to protect Formosa (Taiwan) from a potential Chinese invasion. Now, seventy years later, the American government is, once again, committing to Taiwan's defence from a mainland invasion.
My thinking is pretty clear; China will not be
militarily invading Taiwan in the next one to two years, unless something
significant changes in the international political landscape. The conditions
are not right for such a move, and there is a probability that such a military
option will fail, dragging China and the rest of the world into a deep
depression. Earlier this year, the prospects for such an invasion may have
seemed higher, yet there frankly has been no realistic likelihood of an actual
invasion anytime recently. Nor is it likely to happen soon.
Taiwan and the Straits
My determination that there will not be an invasion is
based on a number of factors that come together to influence decision-making,
particularly in Beijing.
First, some history
China, as we know it today, is the result of centuries
of political and social evolution, and civil war. Since the 1949 civil war in
which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ultimately prevailed, the
"self-governing province" of Taiwan has been the final bastion of the
remnants of the defeated and exiled Nationalist government.
In the post-1949 era, with Soviet communism entrenched
in Eastern Europe and communist movements looking more threatening worldwide,
it was natural that the US and Europe would provide direct support to Chiang
Kai-shek. The communist invasion of Korea and subsequent Chinese military and
material support for North Korea cemented Western support for an
"independent" and democratic Taiwan.
Mainland China, however, never accepted Taiwan as
anything other than a renegade province, a Chinese island purloined by a
defeated and fleeing group of Chinese. To this day, China has not changed its
opinion. In the 1970s, Richard Nixon "opened" China, at the price of
Taiwanese claims to be the legitimate representatives of all of China. This included
the recognition by Washington of Beijing as the rightful government of a single
Chinese nation that included Taiwan. Recognition of Beijing's supremacy is not
the same as abandoning Taiwan.
And so, as country after country removed their embassies
from Taipei, including the US, China grew in confidence that one day soon
Taiwan would be reunified, by choice or by coercion. Yet that has not happened,
and Beijing's patience is running out. What to do? China has limited options,
as the only alternative to an invasion is for the people of Taiwan to elect a
government with a unification platform.
So, Beijing can wait, or go to war.
In the years since the end of the civil war and the
Korean war, China has gone to war once, invading Vietnam in 1979 in support of
Cambodia. The PLA did not acquit itself very well at all.
Suffice to say, China does not have a (recent) history
of invading countries or, as Clausewitz famously phrased it, engaging in
"politics by other means". Unlike western powers and superpowers, the
use of "kinetic" force (warfare) has not been the norm nor even very
high on the list of China's options.
In addition, China has seen that patience delivers to
them what they most desire. A negotiated return delivered Hong Kong (and Macau) back to
complete Beijing control, while maintaining good relations with the West. Yes,
Beijing has broken elements of the transfer agreement (nothing unusual there),
but they did wait an entire generation before doing so. Patience.
Subsequently in Hong Kong, China has found that getting
someone else (local) to deliver transition (while it provides their “backbone”)
is messy for a while but produced good outcomes (for China). The rest of the
world simply watched. Clearly, for China, the transition plan worked. Patience
and planning.
China is a “natural owner” of a different strategy – and
different risks – to achieve its aims in this regard, so why go outside its
“comfort zone”?
So, what are the various
factors influencing my assessment?
1. Socialism with Chinese
characteristics.
Deng
famously said in a "60 Minutes" interview in 1986:
"To get rich is no sin. However, what we mean by
getting rich is different from what you mean. Wealth in a socialist society
belongs to the people."
This was not the start of economic liberalisation in China, but encapsulated the concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics". Put simply, China can grow rich, but the Communist Party will always remain in power. The Party's determination to do so has been demonstrated, and there is no realistic alternative to the CCP (Chinese Communist Party).
"Socialism with Chinese characteristics” leveraging
globalisation has turned China from one of the poorest countries in the world
into a solidly middle-income country on its way to becoming a
middle-upper-income country. This has not happened by accident, but by
developing trading relations across the globe, and by engaging in massive
internal infrastructure and market development activity at home. In raw terms,
China's GDP is on the cusp of eclipsing that of the United States.
Any significant interruption of economic growth and
stability at home will endanger the CCP and, in particular, Xi Jinping. Indeed,
the party and government apparatus will have little difficulty in retaining
power, but unrest is not good for growth, and lack of growth is not good for
the Party, and in particular, for the Chairman of the Party and his desire to
remain Chairman for an additional, unprecedented, third five-year term.
2. Current macro-economic
situation
China runs a greater than $650 billion trade surplus with the rest of the world with the vast majority of its exports travelling by sea. China exports over $2.5 trillion annually with the US as its largest importing partner (18%). Chinese imports over $2 trillion in goods and services every year.
$2.5 trillion of exports directly employs a massive
swath of the Chinese population, and supports untold millions more people
across the country. Disruption to that employment base will ripple through the
economy very quickly.
An invasion of Taiwan would directly threaten that
economic engine, because the economic fallout would not be limited to relations
with the United States but would impact trade relations with most of its major
trading partners.
3. Energy & raw
materials
China imports over 30% of its energy needs, the vast
majority of which comes by sea. Until recently, there was a steady stream of
coal ships from Australia, a flow that has slowed dramatically due to available
alternative sources, and the Australian government making comments deemed inappropriate
by China.
Over the past fifteen years, China's import of non-food raw materials has almost quadrupled, from around $100 billion monthly to $400billion or more some months.
How long will the Chinese economy continue to function
with 30% of imports removed? Likewise, how long will factories work without
inputs, including the computer chips that China (and the rest of the world)
rely on Taiwan to provide?
This
is no idle threat or risk:
"In particular, Taiwan's position in the world of semiconductor manufacturing is a bit like Saudi Arabia's status in OPEC. TSMC has a 53% market share of the global foundry market (factories contracted to make chips designed in other countries). Other Taiwan-based manufacturers claim a further 10% of the market."
China has been working on a strategic solution, the “belt
and road initiative”. Already very successful in providing non-sea access to
markets, its continued usefulness exists only if there are countries willing to
trade at the other end of the road.
4. What is China learning
from the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
There can be little doubt that China is watching the
Russian invasion of Ukraine very closely. And China is taking a number of
evolving lessons. There is so much to consider, and so many lessons that impact China's short- and medium-term contemplation of any unification-by-force.
The lessons broadly fall into two categories; those
supporting an invasion of Taiwan, and those indicating against an invasion (for
now).
5. Arguments for an
invasion in the short term include:
A. The West doesn't want to get into a shooting war.
The West, and very specifically the US, does not want to
engage in a shooting war with anyone, and will go to great lengths to avoid
committing their personnel directly to a fight. The West may provide material
support to the regime in Taipei, but will not commit troops or their military
assets directly. The defence of Ukraine is being carried out by Ukrainians
alone, and if the Ukrainian military is defeated, Ukraine will fall. The
"cavalry" will not ride to the rescue.
China may be taking a lesson that if they can quickly
defeat the Taiwanese military, the West will, in effect, allow the
(re)establishment of Beijing's authority over Taiwan, as they did with
Crimea.
B. After Afghanistan, the US lost the will to fight.
In particular, the United States is exhausted from
foreign wars and will not commit to another war (at this time). The rapid
collapse of Afghanistan was preventable, but the United States no longer had
the will to fight to prop up a foreign government. The failure of the American
puppet regime in Kabul provided the world, including Moscow and Beijing, with
ample evidence that both American capabilities and national will had failed.
If China is going to invade Taiwan, it must be done
before a resurgence in American national will occurs. The unanswerable question
is how long Beijing thinks the window of opportunity is open.
C. China's PLA and PLAN are now modern western-quality
military forces.
If China has taken any lesson from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is that the PLA (People's Liberation Army) and PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy) must be well trained and well equipped with a modern inventory. On today’s battlefields, raw numbers do not win wars or secure and retain objectives. Massed artillery has its place, but only if that artillery can be brought to bear on targets, and Taiwan is 130 kilometres away at the closest point (excluding the Kinmen islands, 10 km from the mainland city of Xiamen). Leadership in Beijing may believe that the PLA and PLAN have reached that level of professionalism, and are supported by the infrastructure and modern capabilities needed to affect a successful invasion.
Or it may be wishful thinking. I suspect the leadership
in Beijing is not (though I have no basis for this statement) as locked into
groupthink and a sycophantic echo chamber as Russia appears to have been and
remains.
Years of economic development and peace have not been
years of military idleness - Beijing has been building a world-class military
capability. The PLA today is a modern, well-trained and well-armed military
with no worrisome neighbours that might threaten invasion. National expenditure
on defence is second only to the United States in gross terms, and much of that
has gone into a decades-long modernisation programme.
The percentage of GDP spent on defence is, however, relatively low by international standards, at a reported 1.7% of GDP. How accurate this number is may be debatable, but without foreign adventures and the need to maintain a vast "empire", China perceives that it is getting good value for that expenditure.
What is clear is that China can massively outspend
Taiwan. In 2021, China spent $230 billion on defence against Taiwan's spend of
$10.5 billion. The military capacity of the two is also lopsided in the
extreme. On paper, China should be able to dominate Taiwan with ease. Sound
familiar?
D. Economic consequences run both ways.
Europe’s dependence on Russian energy exports created enormous
angst for European nations while global sanctions are clearly impacting Russia.
China’s exports though are of an entirely different
scale and, additionally, Taiwan’s exports of critical technology supplies would
stop overnight. Global pain would be both immediate and extreme. Pre-Ukraine,
China may have assessed that the world just couldn’t cope with such a scenario
and therefore there would be much noise but little response. The invasion could
proceed. But, the European response to the Ukraine energy situation was
unexpected. Europe accepted hardship would be incurred because it was taking
the “right moral approach”. Russia’s cutting of energy to Europe has not split
the NATO alliance, and Europe has now shown it might be able to absorb the
economic pain. Could the US?
6. What lessons is China
learning from Ukraine – against an invasion of Taiwan?
A. You'd better get the logistics and the intelligence right.
If there has been any lesson for all observers from the
Russian invasion, it is that you'd better get the logistics and supporting
intelligence right. Sure, there are plenty of other lessons, ranging from the
importance of a professional NCO cadre to the quality of strategic and
operational leadership. But underlying all of these has been the importance of
getting the right resources to the right place at the right time, in the
quantities required to exceed force needs. It is easier to reposition assets
after the battle is won, than it is to win the battle with the wrong or
inadequate assets. And if your intelligence doesn’t tell you where to put the
assets then success is unlikely.
The Taiwan Straits represents a logistic challenge as
daunting as ever there was. D-Day required complete command of the 33km wide English
Channel, not the 180km strait that separates Taiwan from China (at the
narrowest point). In addition, the allies had almost complete control of the
flow of intel from England to the German high command.
Even with almost complete control of the waterway,
control of intel, freedom to select landing locations, overwhelming firepower
from the massed US and British fleets, and complete control of the skies,
Eisenhower still prepared a one-page message that he would read out in the case
of a failure of the landings, in which he would accept complete personal
responsibility for the failure.
B. Even the apparently weak will rally to defend their
freedom.
The expectation what that Russia would take Kyiv in
three to four days, that Zelenskyy would flee, and that opposition would
collapse. Exactly the opposite happened. While most believed Russia would not
invade, the military planned as if they would, and the people of Ukraine
rallied to the defence of their country. Russia expected roses and “bread and
salt”. What they received was quite significantly different.
China may expect Taiwan to collapse, but Ukraine has
provided a lesson that such expectations usually end in ridicule. Taiwan has
held free and fair elections for decades, while viewing the continued
disenfranchisement of its brothers and sisters across the strait. They know
very well what is in store for them, and the only realistic expectation is that
the people of Taiwan will likewise rally to the defence of their nation.
C. Decapitation strikes are more complex than they
thought.
Once China believes that it can muster and maintain an
invasion fleet sufficient to affect a successful landing, there remains the
need to "decapitate" the political and military leadership of Taiwan.
Confusion at the top of the Taiwanese government in the days (not hours)
following a landing will be vital to ensure the rapid collapse of opposition.
Unified leadership will be able to sustain resistance long enough for American
military aid, and potentially direct military engagement, to begin.
Russia attempted to decapitate the Ukrainian leadership,
and failed. They are paying the price for that failure. What should have, and
could have been a rapid collapse of Ukraine has turned into a nightmare with no
easy way out, and has become the embodiment of the "sunk cost
fallacy".
D. Murphy was an optimist.
There is no military (some might argue any) endeavour
that will go according to plan. Flexibility in approach is critical, and this
means a level of redundancy and devolved decision-making authority that may or
may not exist in the PLA and PLAN. Simply put, the PLA and PLAN have not been
involved in a shooting war for so long that there is no evidence of how
effective their junior office and NCO corps will be in the field. Without that
battlefield experience, it would be unwise to hold exceptionally high
expectations of their performance.
Because things go wrong, and in combat and military
endeavours, lots of things go wrong. The soil will not hold the weight of the
vehicles as expected, supplies will not arrive on time, air defence systems
might work, or they might not. The quality and accuracy of intel will be
sketchy at best, and the "fog of war" will limit the ability of
commanders to issue meaningful orders in a timely manner. Poor intel favours
the defender in almost all cases.
Ukraine demonstrated that having a big army does not
equate to an effective military. It also demonstrated that without a cadre of
seasoned NCOs with the ability to make tactical decisions, an offensive force
would be very limited in its ability to adapt to changing conditions.
"Murphy's Law" states that "anything that
can go wrong, will go wrong". The corollary is "Murphy was an optimist".
E. The "West" can mobilise tangible support
very quickly.
The Western "system" of overlapping alliances
(including the very Eastern ASEAN alliance) works on a combination of consensus
and individual national priorities. As long as those national priorities do not
contradict the common values, there is little disagreement beyond words.
Consensus in strategic outlook and foundational values enables individual or
collective national actions. This is the international system that Donald Trump
disparaged and attempted to withdraw the United States from (and mercifully
failed).
The Russian invasion tested the European (and NATO in
particular) system of joint agreement in principles and individual actions.
While no NATO country was attacked, NATO members viewed the invasion as a
collective threat. Each country then determined the nature, speed and quantity
of support that they would provide to Ukraine, and the level of sanctions that
they would apply to Russia. Not all countries have contributed to Ukraine's defence,
and not all have applied the same level of sanctions. But all have collectively
agreed that a response was required, and each is responding as they determine
most appropriate.
What this means for China and Taiwan is that invasion by
China will be met with the same level of international resolve, a level of
resolve that will take China decades to overcome, and a tarnishing of China's
international reputation as a peaceful partner in global development.
But will the West/East respond as they did with Ukraine?
Taiwan is a long way from Europe and the only feasible supply routes will be
from the Pacific. The PLAN has, post-Pelosi, demonstrated the capacity to blockade
(who knows how effectively) so, unlike Ukraine, supply support to Taiwan is
likely to have to run the gauntlet. A very different proposition. Breaking the
gauntlet may necessarily involve sinking Chinese vessels and that would quickly
lead to global conflict.
7. What lessons is China
taking from Biden's comments and from Pelosi's visit to Taiwan?
Biden three times through the first half of 2022, vowedto militarily defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
Each time the White House "walked back" Biden's comments, reiterating
that the official US policy regarding Taiwan is "Strategic
Ambiguity". The anti-Biden press used this as more "proof" that
Biden is a doddery old man unable to control his thinking or speaking.
China does not care if Biden is fully sane (it already dealt
with the weirdness of Trump). China understands that when the President of the
United States says something, he is not speaking for himself, but his
administration. Biden's clarity or senility is irrelevant to Beijing; it is the
fact that he has "said the quiet bit out loud" that matters.
For over 50 years, China has understood that the
President speaks for the implementation of policy, but Congress makes the laws
and pays the bills. While Nixon could speak to a One-China with Beijing as its
capital, Congress could pass laws funding Taiwanese defence.
In this context, Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was a
bold statement that the US Congress stands behind the President's comments, and
will legislate to support the American defence of Taiwan if required. Little noticed was a follow-up visit by a five-member delegation that included at
least one Republican representative, confirming that both political parties (in
a post-Trump era) are united in their resolve to defend Taiwan. It
was as much a very loud statement to America's allies across the globe as it
was a clear warning to Beijing.
8. So why all the noise?
Every five years the Chinese Communist Party Congress
elects a general secretary for the coming period. President Xi has held that
position for ten years, against the unwritten standards, post-Mao that the
position should not be a for-life position, and that political power should
pass in a controlled manner. Xi is seeking a third five-year term, and he needs
to ensure there is little or no opposition. That might not be so easy in a time
of pandemic and debilitating drought.
National security and the external threat have been
political cards played again and again across the world. For example, it worked
for George W. Bush but it backfired spectacularly for Leopoldo Galtieri when he invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982. Xi is playing the "united
China" card, and the external threat of a US-backed Taiwan. Sabre rattling
works, as long as you don't actually need to use the sabre, at which point
things become far more problematic.
So, Xi has plenty of reasons to ramp up the noise (which
is all this is), but little need to act on the noise. He reinforces his
credentials as the great leader who will (re)unite the country.
But recent Chinese history argues for the exercise of
patience and planning for the achievement of national goals. So much better to
be patient and gain everything they want, than to go to war with their biggest
customer and risk isolation from much of the rest of the world. That wouldn’t
be much of a plan.
Instead, China will be supportive of Russia’s aggression.
Well, sort of. China is using "support" for Russia to balance against
the West, and to ensure that China will have access to Russian energy assets
going forward. China is not sending military aid, and is careful with how it
breaches sanctions. Likewise, the US is careful to make sure there are ways for
China to continue to do business with Russia and not be in flagrant breach of
sanctions. So, individual Russians remain sanctioned, and any Chinese company
that can be demonstrated to do business with those individuals will be at risk,
if those companies do business with the US or western allies.
A strategic alternative
Taiwan has powerful friends because it is a democracy
and because it has valuable trading assets. Remove or diminish the powerful
friends and the situation and risk profile for re-acquisition changes. The
major powers have repeatedly demonstrated that they answer calls for help far
more quickly from countries that have things they want than from countries they
don’t.
So, the biggest strategic lever that China has is its
ability to out-technology Taiwan. Subvert the massive market share Taiwan has
in highly-prized technology supplies and Taiwan’s position deteriorates quite
rapidly. Taiwan doesn’t have a fall-back position in natural resources or
strategic location to bolster its inherent strategic value.
China has been gobbling up natural resources critical to
technology all around the world, China has some of the best (if not the best)
robotics in the world. China has an enormous quantity of skilled people and
available production capacity. It will take time and planning but China is
rather good at patience and planning.
Summary
The costs of an invasion of Taiwan now would be far too high, for something that will be accomplished with time. But noise is needed for internal purposes, and American noise is needed to remind American allies that the Trump era is over and America is back. Nobody wants a new war, but there are perfectly good reasons to make plenty of noise. As Winston Churchill is reputed to have said, "Jaw Jaw is better than war war".
