1. Introduction
The 28 countries (soon to be 27) of the EU vary
considerably in their economics, religion (or lack of), languages and national
characters. Originally the creation of the EU was midwifed by the US after WWII,
driven by a need to ensure both a “western” democratic, peaceful Europe, and common bulwark against the Soviet Union that their desire to create their own
strategic depth. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the EU grew to
include former Easter European countries and consolidated membership on the Med
with the inclusion of Greece. Overlaying everything was the introduction of the
Euro in 2000; the common currency that now exposes the fundamental economic
fragility of the entire European experiment. Meanwhile other pressures expose the centre's determination to impose their culture and cultural priorities on member nations.
All this bares a more than passing resemblance to
Yugoslavia, formed out of the ashes of WWI, with Balkan enemies forced into a
single national entity and economy with a faux common history, common currency
and a similarly non-democratic central government. Yugoslavia was then reformed
into a single country after WWII. Unfortunately, Yugoslavia was held together
not by a common democratic system with open and free elections, but by a single
party that exercised coercive control over a number of national groups, with
central control in the hands of one national-ethnic group, the Serbians.
Equally unfortunately, the EU is being held together by a
non-democratic system dominated by a single national / ethnic group that
exercises coercive power over the economic and political activity of member
nations. Perhaps the major difference, other than sheer size, between the two
is leadership of Europe by a finance-dominated technocracy instead
of a political party.
Further, the pressures of Brexit may well contribute to individual
countries attempting to negotiate with the UK to cement their own best
interests, to the detriment of the rest of the EU. President Macron of France
has this week warned that such individual dealing may result in a “prisoners’ dilemma”
problem, potentially splitting the EU.
We must hope that when the inevitable breakup happens, what
follows is a Slovenian divorce trajectory and not the Bosnian. The only
realistic alternative will be a civil war of consolidation of European power in
the hands of a single dominating ethnic group, with the potential for a result
more similar to Syrian history of aligned ethic, clan and tribal groups under a
dominant ethnic - tribal group. That didn't work out too well when exposed to
external interference after the "Arab Spring".
That, after all, is what happened twice in the past
century, resulting the 50 – 100 million deaths in those “World Wars”.
So our resulting options are Slovenian or Bosnian in
nature; individual national independence with the acceptance of the centre, or a bloody civil war
designed to change the “reality” on the ground through the imposition of ethnic
and cultural domination.
We’ve been down this road already, twice. I hope Europe
and its constituent parts will take that former. My fervent hope is that the EU will find a way through. My fear is it might not.
2. Forced Friends
After two twentieth century wars for central European
domination, Germany and surrounding nations lay in waste. As the perpetrator of
the wars, the Morgenthau Plan of 1944 was to create an agrarian Germany that
would never again have the industrial might to create and field an army strong
enough to dominate Europe. Roosevelt himself wrote "Too many people here
and in England hold the view that the German people as a whole are not
responsible for what has taken place – that only a few Nazis are responsible.
That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people must have it driven
home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy
against the decencies of modern civilization."
This plan was never going to survive the realities of
post-war Europe, and the need initially to feed and rebuild, and ultimately to
face down the Soviet Union. And in Western Europe there was only one industrial
power. As Yannis Varoufakis points out in his book "And the Weak Suffer
What They Must?", even at the end of the Second World War in April 1945,
defeated Germany still had over double the factory capacity of France.
And so while Germany was forgiven for the war (including
70% of its debt) in order to become the industrial bulwark against communism,
the rest of Europe was required to play along, pretending that is was just a
few strange creatures called “Nazis” that perpetrated war and destruction
across Western and Eastern Europe, deep into European Asia and across the
Mediterranean. France was none too pleased, as the initial stages of what
became the EU started specifically in order to enable Germany to rebuild its
industrial base while (hopefully) limiting the ability or need for Germany to
convert that industrial based into a war machine, again. France and the Benelux
(Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) countries had little option but to
attempt to contain Germany, just as the Americans used Germany to help contain
the USSR. German containment took the form of NATO and the economic links that
lead to a strong Deutsche Mark and eventually to a strong Euro. Yet the source
of the strong Deutsche Mark was the economic disparity between Germany and the
rest of Europe, a disparity that exists today.
Fundamentally then, the EU began as an economic union in
which former adversaries were cajoled into merging interest to the ultimate
benefit of all (or so the theory) with the immediate and lasting greater
benefit to one - Germany. Friends they pretend to be, but memories are still
there on one side, and while forgiveness may be official, forgetfulness and
re-framing is the rule. Crimes against occupied countries and peoples were
committed by "Nazis" not by Germans. To this day it is almost
impossible to find a German whose father or grandfather was a Nazi, or who
committed war crimes. In the formerly occupied countries, people today remember
growing up sitting on their grandmother's lap, hearing tales of the occupation.
These memories do not disappear when those that went
through the occupation die, these are the memories that forever undermine the
politically and socially appropriate forgetfulness required for countries and
peoples to work together.
The treatment of Greece by the German Finance Ministry
and the ECB (not to mention the IMF, etc) has done little to encourage
forgetfulness or forgiveness. The forgiveness of German debt after multiple
aggressions still burns Greece, as German (and to be fair, French and other)
major banks and national institutions gouge the pitiful remaining Euros out of
Greece to protect their non-Greek shareholders and governments.
While Greece is probably the most visible example of how
the EU is failing Europeans, there are other examples across the continent.
These range from economc disadvantage, cultural suppression, loss of legal
sovereignty, and the imposition of demographic choices opposed by the
individual member countries.
3. Yugoslav breakup
It is important to remember that Yugoslavia was a
multi-ethic "republic" and an economic union, forged out of the First
and then again out of the Second World Wars. So in many ways Yugoslavia
provides a model of the EU, including multi-generational cultural integration
and an enforced political as well as economic union. Yugoslavia was also an
economically successful country, certainly when compared to the rest of the
Warsaw Pact and other Socialist countries.
So why did Yugoslavia fail?
While there were a number of contributory causes, the
death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980 began a long process of dis-union and
resurgence of nationalism, driven in no small part by each of the constituent
national groups losing faith in a centre dominated by one of the nationalities;
the Serbians. With its capital in Belgrade, it was always natural that Serbia
would be the dominant nationality.
Yet Yugoslavia had come through a period of significant
market liberalisation and economic growth, and had, in large part, achieved
reasonable and consistent GDP growth through increase international trade. Unfortunately
that liberalisation stagnated due in part to internal demands of additional
democracy in Croatia.
In his paper "Socialist Growth Revisited: Insights from
Yugoslavia", Leonard Kukić demonstrates that Yugoslavia was able to
demonstrate considerable economic growth through the 1960s and 1970, but were
unable to continue that growth into the 1980s.
"Given their capacity to embark on radical reforms
during the early years, how come Yugoslavs were unable to reform their economy
later on? Policy makers were aware of remedies, but politics got into way.
Duˇsan Bilandˇzi´, a historian and a politician, reports in his memoirs that in
1970 the Central Committee of the CPY accepted draft proposals aimed at
liberalising capital markets and entry of firms (Bilandˇzi´c, 2006). The aim of
these policies was to diminish or eliminate the apparent labour distortions.
However, these policies were abandoned with the flaring of political and ethnic
tensions by the 1971 calls for democracy in Croatia, a member republic of
Yugoslavia.
The inability of Yugoslavia to cope with the 1979 oil
shock was compounded by a major domestic shock. The lifelong president of
Yugoslavia, Tito, died in 1980. He was replaced by an ineffectual collective
presidency containing nine members. They lacked political capital to pursue
planned reforms."
The breakup of Yugoslavia and the following civil war is
frequently "blamed" on the Serbians and their attempts to create an
ethnically cleansed territory that included major portions of Bosnia. Ultimately
Slobodan Milosevic was convicted of war crimes in The Hague, and died in
prison. Numerous other Serbians have been tried and convicted, as have
Croatians and others.
It is also worth remembering that there was a history of
inter-communal violence on a massive scale during WWII in particular, with the
Croatians Ustaše responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands, and had
the goal of an ethnically pure Croatia. While we (now) think of the Serbians
and the primary culprits, they look to a long history of being the underdog,
fighting to protect their culture and society.
So the lack of strong central government, faltering
economic performance, long memories, rejection of a centrally imposed
mono-culture, and rising nationalism worked together to doom Yugoslavia.
4. Next for Europe
Probably the single largest difference between Yugoslavia
and the EU today is the lack of large scale inflows of economic migrants
(politically correctly labelled "refugees") from Africa and war-torn
Middle-Eastern countries. This influx, aided and abetted by EU member countries
public comments and demonstrations of welcome or at least acceptance on arrive,
has created a new dynamic not present in Yugoslavia prior to its breakup; an
imposed external cultural disruption seemingly imposed by the central
government, in this case the EU with its mandatory quotas imposed on member
countries.
The issue is not immigrants, as the Open Boarders policy
has facilitated the flow of Europeans between countries for almost two decades.
The issue is the forfeiture of national sovereignty, with the illegal immigration
issue providing the highly visible demonstration of such forfeiture. It has
been too easy to label Europeans as racist for opposing illegal migration, yet
to do so sweeps under the carpet the far wider range of issues that are
associated with centralised determination of individual cultures, nation-level
priorities, and the ability of the dominant participants to override the
desires of local peoples and communities.
Below are a few of the strains facing Europe in the form
of specific country tensions with the EU. These are not the only tensions, and
while none of these may be the spark, quite possibly one of them could.
5. The Precarious State of the EU: Other pressures
The United Kingdom is by
far not the only European country or region that is experiencing problems in
the relationship with Brussels. The European experiment continues, and at its
heart remains a struggle between demands for regional and national sovereignty,
and the desire for a continued concentration of power in the centre. How this
will end remains an open question, the experience of the UK is only one example
of the stresses that Brussels is experiencing, some of which challenge the
current nation-states that make up Europe, while others challenge the very
concept of a single unified Europe.
The following are five
(only) specific examples of the ongoing stresses on the European Experiment.
These will not go away quickly, and some threaten the very cohesion and
assumption of an "Ever Greater Union" as demanded by Brussels and the
European Commission. There are a number of other examples of stresses, and we
will watch these evolve over the coming months and years.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
5.1. Catalonia
On October 27th, the
Catalonia Parliament declared independence.
This was foreshadowed by the family of the Catalan president (Carles
Puigdemont) leaving the country the day before. How Europe and the EU respond
over the coming weeks and months will impact the viability and future of the EU
and the European Commission. It is no surprise that the UK has rejected any
suggestion that it should recognise Catalonia, for to do so would undermine any
hope of a successful Brexit negotiation.
After arrests and (gentle)
suppression, new elections were held in December 2017. Voter turnout was high,
at around 80% of eligible voters, and the pro-independence parties won.
The mess in Catalonia will
not be getting better any time soon, and it was the Spanish Government's fear
of contagion that resulted in the strong and immediate rejection of any
Scottish dreams of joining the EU as a separate country. That contagion appears
to have come to fruition, after decades of perceived grievances by both sides,
and a not-fully forgotten legacy of the Franco era.
With the referendum, Article
155 of the Spanish government, and now a renewed electoral mandate for
independence, we can only watch and hope that this does not become the European
Union's first fully fledged civil war. Regardless of the outcome, this cannot
and will not remain a Spanish problem.
5.2. Austria
The recent elections in
Austria should not come as a shock, as there has been a growing backlash
against centralised Brussels control and usurpation of national priorities,
with the immigration crisis providing the catalyst for demands for greater
local authority. Yet the Austrian People's Party, the conservative party
founded in 1945, instead of running in second place, finds itself with the
highest percentage of the vote and number of seats, and with the ability to go
into coalition with the right wing party, the Freedom Party of Austria.
"Austria became the
latest European country to take a sharp turn right on Sunday, with the
conservative People's Party riding a hard-line position on immigration to
victory in national elections and likely to form a government with a nationalist
party that has long advocated for an even tougher stance."
"If there's one topic
that really dominated the campaign, its migration and integration," said
Sylvia Kritzinger, a political analyst at the University of Vienna.
"Especially with Kurz, it always came back to immigration. We had very
little discussion of the issues beyond that."
For most of the past two
years, these two conservative parties have polled at a combined greater than
50% support, and the snap election called this year has created the opportunity
for these two to rule without the need for centrist or left-of-centre support.
Should the new government
in Vienna actually follow through on their platform, they will quickly find
themselves in the same situation as Poland, potentially having their voting
rights restricted, or more.
5.3. Poland
Poland is not alone in its
desire for full EU membership on its own terms, and recent Polish law has been
in direct conflict with EU legislation and regulation. Poland's primary
objective in joining the EU was freedom of movement and economic advantage,
with an ultimate joining of the Eurozone. Security from Russian hegemony was
achieved, they hope, by joining NATO. This was designed to balance against the
need for, and to reinforce, the concept of collective defence.
Yet Poland is a profoundly
conservative and Roman Catholic country now joined to a sectarian Europe.
Recent Polish law has been in conflict with the EU to the point that Brussels
has discussed sanctions against Poland. While there is no realistic chance that
Poland would exit the EU, it may contribute to a paralysed Brussels unable the
marshal the 27 votes required for almost anything.
As recently as August
2017, there were threats that Poland could lose its voting rights in Brussels.
Such a move would not engender much support from other marginalised EU members.
"The fact that a European tribunal decision
is rejected so arrogantly is evidence of something very dangerous in my opinion
— it is an overt attempt to put Poland in conflict with the European
Union," Tusk said. (EU President and
former Polish Prime Minster)
Tusk noted that several actions of the Polish
government appear to be "very controversial" and could risk the
country's continued EU status. Brussels has already been considering triggering
Article 7 of the EU treaty, a legal process which could suspend the country's
voting rights.
"It smells like an introduction to an
announcement that Poland does not need the European Union and that Poland is
not needed for the EU," Tusk noted.
5.4. Belgium
The two primary cultural
groups in Belgium have a long history of working together, primarily because
the country was created as an artificial buffer state between Germany and
France in 1830. Roman Catholic Flanders and Roman Catholic Wallonia
historically had less to fear from each other than from their Protestant or
Anti-clerical peoples of the Netherlands and France. The second half of the
20th Century and the creation of the EEC reduced those external threats, and
created the conditions for sectarian conflict. While Belgium is not going to
collapse into civil war, it has been referred to as the "First
Bosnia".
In 2010 Belgium managed to
go for 541 days without a government, and the two regions continue to co-exist,
but with continued moves to greater regional autonomy. This was after the 196
days without a government in 2007. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%9311_Belgian_political_crisis)
With Flanders contributing
close to 80% of GDP while accounting for 65% of the population, a breakaway, or
even a devolution that strips Wallonia of tax revenues, will force Brussels
(EU, not Belgium) to face the prospect of a further long period of
no-government in Belgium, or potentially a desire for full independence by
Flanders.
5.5. Czech Republic
And so, with 61% voter
turnout, the Euro-sceptic oligarch Andrej Babis is to be the new Prime Minister
of the Czech Republic. The October 20 election puts Mr Babis in line to form a
new government.
"The 63-year-old made
his estimated $4bn (£3bn) fortune in chemicals, food and media - but he has
also faced numerous scandals including a fraud indictment and accusations he
was a communist-era police agent. He says he would not bring the Czech Republic
in to the Eurozone but he wants the country to stay in the EU, telling Reuters
he would propose changes to the European Council on issues like food quality
and a 'solution to migration'."
This represents a core EU
member states that has turned from the even-closer union demanded of Brussels,
making the "every closer union" appear to be more for a French,
German, Dutch, and Belgian dream than an actual potential outcome for the
foreseeable future.
6. Slovenia or Bosnia?
With the stresses in Europe, and that disparity that has
been caused by a semi-centralised union devoid of effective internal transfers,
and therefore with countries unable to create balance through exchange rate
management or regulatory discretion, pressures continue to build, ultimately to
a breaking point.
If Germany, and to a lesser degree France also, radically
changes their outlook and policies to be “Europe-first, then Germany” instead
of “Deutschland über alles” then there is hope. The changes required would be
at the political, economic and cultural level and would be so far reaching as
to ensure the swift demise of any government that attempt to implement the
needed changes. Therefore I hold out little hope that German will enable the
changes needed to keep Europe together.
So our resulting options are Slovenian or Bosnian in
nature; independence with the acceptance of the centre, or a bloody civil war
designed to change the “reality” on the ground through the imposition of ethnic
or cultural domination.
We’ve been down this road already, twice. I hope Europe
and its constituent parts will take that former.
