The Russian invasion of Ukraine is being called all sorts of things, from the most brutal act of aggression and war crimes this century, to a failed military debacle of unprecedented levels. Few are calling it a success. I suspect the truth is somewhere in between. Certainly, it is a war of aggression, and indeed, the initial phases of the war were a complete debacle for the Russian military. But wars are not fought in a day or week, except in very exceptional circumstances, and a territorial war such as Russia in Ukraine is a long and ugly affair.
First, Ukraine is a huge country by almost any standard. And Russia is even bigger. This is a country of 40 million people invaded by a country of 150 million, the world’s second-largest military (Russian) versus the world’s 20-something power. Three months to put the pieces in place for a swift invasion and decapitation strike against the capital. On paper, the war should be over by now.
That was the simplistic view, and the expectation until President Zelensky said, “I need ammunition, not a ride”. At that moment, the war changed fundamentally, and the belligerents changed.
Like it or not, Russia is now at war with the 900 million people of the NATO and EU countries, even if everyone is pretending that Russia and NATO are not at war, even if the President of the United States says that the US will not enter the war. Russia is now at war with the world’s most powerful economic and military alliance. Putin went to war with #20, and finds himself effectively at war with #1+ most NATO countries, and Ukraine, of course.
The “West” is not at war with Russia, at least not officially. But it certainly feels like it, without the nukes flying (which is, of course, the reason that the “West” is not actually at war with Russia). The United States was not at war with Nazi Germany or Japan until December 8th, 1941, more than two and a half years after Germany invaded France, and three years after Germany and Russia invaded and divided Poland. Of course not. Yet the United States was arming and feeding the UK and arming the USSR long before officially entering the war. The United States was economically sanctioning and embargoing Japan for the invasion of China. American “volunteer” airmen flew the latest US fighters out of China. But that was most definitely the US at war with Japan.
Fast forward to today, and the “West” is not at war with Russia.
Russia has invaded Ukraine, and those are the only two countries that, officially, are at war. Putin will avoid actually “dropping” anything onto any NATO country, even though the eastward expansion of NATO (at the request of the new members, not the occupation by NATO) is one of the casus belli for the war. Just as Russia invaded Georgia to stop their attempt to join NATO, Putin has invaded Ukraine not to liberate Russian brothers (and sisters) in eastern Ukraine, but to make sure that there are no doubts about the limits to the eastward expansion of NATO. Certainly, these are not the only reasons. Control of all access to the Black Sea and a land bridge to the Crimea are reasons, as is the idea that "Vlad the Great" has restored Russian glory.
But what I really wanted to discuss is how this plays out over the two to ten-year window. I’m not a military expert, so I cannot predict the next three weeks, though I do have some guesses. The two to ten-year period is what matters now.
Regardless of how the war plays out on the battlefield, I can comfortably make some predictions about the coming years with the caveat of my favourite aphorisms: “It is easy to predict the future, but really tough to get the dates right”.
So here goes.
Russia may prevail on the plains of eastern and central Ukraine. They may break through an exhausted Ukrainian military, regardless of the speed of arrival of supplies. Training crews to effectively use advanced western systems takes much longer than Ukraine has, so they must rely on what they know. This explains the provision of what seem to be antiquated weapons systems (other than the very modern and relatively ‘easy’ to learn and use human-portable anti-armour and anti-air systems). The plains of eastern and central Ukraine are more suited to massed armour and artillery, and less suitable to the hide, strike and disappear small unit tactics.
Russian artillery will “prepare” the battlefield, and the armour (and APCs – armoured personnel carriers) may be able to exploit the more expansive tree-less spaces. The Russians, hoping for a quick decapitation strike against Kyiv forgot how their armies fight, and it cost them. They are trying to rectify that now.
The ability of Ukraine to prepare the battlefield to suit its defence will determine the outcome on the field. The Russians might be stopped, or they might take half or more of Ukraine. I don’t know.
What we can predict with confidence is that the cost to both sides will be horrendous in people and military hardware and capabilities.
Putin is not stupid, and his generals will, eventually, tell him the cost that is being imposed on his capabilities. The announcement that he had ordered the military not to storm the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works may well have resulted from some honesty from his generals. He can spend his now reduced resources refighting Stalingrad in Mariupol, or he can seal it off and make those resources available for offensive operations north and moving westward.
Russian military resources are finite and are being depleted at an alarming rate, at least alarming for the Russians. We can forget pre-war estimates that Russia has 15,000+ tanks. Too many of those are sitting in open fields rusting, with engines that have not been turned over in decades. Better estimates were in the 3,000 - 4,000 functioning tanks. That force has proved itself no match for human portable anti-armour weapons, and estimated loses of tanks alone are as high as a thousand, and at the lower end at least 500 as documented by Oryx. They are counting losses on both sides based on photographic evidence only, numbers that will be much lower than total losses.
Prediction time
Here is my first prediction
By the time the shooting is done, both sides will be exhausted. Their respective militaries depleted both of material and personnel. By the end of May, this land war will be done, or at least this first spasm of war will be finished. There will be little residual offensive capacity left. A stalemate may have been reached.
Even if Putin wanted to invade a NATO country, he would not have the forces required. It is not feasible to completely strip all troops from the east of the country and send them to Latvia, for example. Out of a pre-war 750,000 army, Russia could commit less than a third directly to the war effort. The rest exist to maintain state authority and to deter potential adversaries, including internal. And a credible force is required to keep the former Soviet states in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) from completely breaking with Moscow.
The Russian military is spent, and will enter a multi-year rebuilding programme. That rebuilding programme will come at the expense of the rest of the Russian economy and people. With the economic sanctions that are and will continue to be in place, I do not expect the Russian military to be able to rebuild as a modern, or should I say a more modern military. They may be able to reach close to their current latest technology levels, but as they try to catch up with where they were, the rest of the world will be moving further into a higher-tech military world.
And here is my second prediction
The economic cost of the war will cripple Russia for a decade and more. Worse, Moscow will find that sanctions, as a longer-term weapon, have prolonged the economic war and will destroy Russia from within. Russian economic growth for the coming decade will be stagnant at best, and in all probability, a decade from now, the Russian economy will be significantly smaller than it is today.
Oil and Gas exports will be the only shining light, and that will dim over time. Russia’s ability to use energy as a tool to blackmail Europe will be gone by the coming winter. The crash programme to decouple from Russian energy will be well underway by the end of summer, and to keep Europe focused, the United States will be delivering gas to Europe for the coming winter. Nuclear power plants scheduled for decommissioning will have their lives extended. France, with 80% of domestic power generation coming from nuclear power, will find itself exporting both electricity and engineering expertise.
It may be a cold winter in Europe, but it will be colder in Russia. This year, and for the foreseeable future.
As I wrote recently sanctions are a long-term weapon. And in the case of Russia, sanctions are going to contribute to a brain drain over the coming decade. Simply put, no matter what the quality of the software developed, the equipment and technology innovations, there will be little probability that Russia will be able to match the investment capability of an interlocking international system.
Moscow has other problems that will result from the sanctions.
This leads to my third prediction
Former satellite states in Central Asia will drift away from Moscow. As long as Russia is their only market, and it will be if sanctions are tight enough, they will be stuck in the same economic toilet bowl that will be Russia. This is going to result in a lot of introspection and a lot of external persuasions – to leave Moscow’s orbit and find their own way. China, the Middle East, or the West? Or a combination.
If they are to avoid a decade of depression, they may choose to disengage somewhat from Russia. The more ruthless the Russian occupation of the parts of Ukraine that they gain or retain control over, the greater the isolation of Russia itself, and for those countries that align themselves with Russia. This will drive a wedge between the CIS states and Russia. And it will be a wedge that will be exploited by western countries looking for markets and looking for resources. The "Great Game" will recommence, if it ever really ended.
Closer to home, Russia will have difficulty keeping hold of Belarus, a country that already looks westward, yet is ruled by President (for life) Aleksandr Lukashenko. The elections of 2020 that returned him for a sixth term resulted in civil unrest that seemed to come close to overthrowing the government. Belarus has remained out of this war, at least, it has not committed actual combat troops to the fight. The next decade will be challenging for Belarus as the economic fallout increases and the authoritarian rule becomes more oppressive, all the while the people continue to watch their Polish and Ukrainian neighbours prosper.
My fourth prediction: China
China has been “sitting on the fence” ready to be Russia’s friend, but also carefully considering its own position going forward. Certainly, China is watching the reaction of the west and the performance of Russia and Ukraine, with an eye on what to expect, should / when they decide it is time to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control. Had Ukraine capitulated quickly, or if the west had splintered as Putin hoped (it is not too late), Beijing might read that it could manage the international reaction to an invasion of Taiwan.
The west has not faltered, while at the same time, they have not allowed themselves to be drawn into the shooting part of this war, yet. Ukraine did not collapse, and a people with less than 40 years of independent statehood have shown just how hard they will fight to protect their independence and identity. This may impact China’s calculations about the ease or difficulty of a Taiwan invasion. They know they will not be greeted as liberators, showered in flowers.
China also knows that its economic future is tied to the west; the United States, and Europe. While the “Belt and Road Initiative” may aim to open new markets in Asia and Africa (and South America), China’s reliance on the massive American and European markets is critical to their continued economic growth. Russia, while an ally of sorts, simply does not currently and will never have the economic clout to displace those other markets and investors. China knows this.
So like the CIS countries, China will be calculating the cost of sanction-busting, and may determine that the cost is too high. Certainly they will get away with buying Russian oil and gas. There is only so much global capacity, and if the west rejects Russian oil and gas, they will need to replace it, and that means competing with China. Turning a blind eye to China importing Russian oil and gas will free up other suppliers, allowing Europe and the US to disconnect completely from Russian energy. China will buy that oil and gas anyway, so the west will turn a blind eye.
This will keep money flowing into Moscow’s coffers, but Moscow will find itself selling at a discount to retain the Chinese market, and the costs of delivery to the Far East are significantly higher than delivery to Europe. China will buy, and the money will flow, but the total value will be far less than before sanctions and far below what will be required to both rebuild the Russian military and resuscitate the Russian economy.
My fifth prediction
Ukraine, or what is left of it territorially, will undergo a decade of rapid economic development and may, within five years, have reached a pre-invasion level of economic prosperity. It will only grow from there. International aid and development will flow into Ukraine for two main reasons; Western guilt at not having done enough to stop the destruction that Russia has wrought on Ukraine, and as a way of ensuring that a well-developed Ukraine is ready and able to join the EU.
Furthermore, Ukraine will find a way, as will NATO, to become a de facto member of NATO and eventually, an actual full member. It is only a matter of time. And a crippled Russian military will not be able to bluster as they did in Georgia and Crimea. Western military aid will continue to flow after the war, with the nature changing to a greater emphasis on training in modern western systems, newer armoured vehicles and modern MBTs (Main Battle Tanks) to replace the Soviet legacy vehicles. These will be the tanks that took on Saddam Hussain’s huge Soviet-era and supplied armoured vehicles, the entire range of T-xx tanks that have not served Russia very well in this invasion.
Ukraine will become a full member of the European family with the economic benefits and security guarantees Zelensky and Ukraine desperately needs.
I think we can also predict that there will be a Neon, wheat, sunflower oil, steel shortage also on a global scale. This will in turn make people look more closely at the other nearby countries and their exports and possibly a reshuffling if any key materials are at risk.
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